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U.S. Federal Reserve Monetary Policy  
and the First Crisis of Securitization: 
Mexico and Latin America, 1994–1995
Abstract: The decisions of the Federal Reserve of the United States (Fed) 
determining interest rates have played a critical role in capital inflows/out-
flows toward Mexico and Latin America. The causal relationship that exists 
between the Fed and emerging markets is quite close; a clear example of 
this is the first crisis of securitization on the global level, which originated 
in Mexico in 1994. The monetary policy of the Fed supported the expansion 
of U.S. investment banks and some institutional investors, thus creating not 
only an enormous bubble in Mexico and other local financial markets in Latin 
America through the expansion of portfolio investment, but also successive 
financial crises during the 1990s when those financial capital flows reversed 
themselves. This article analyzes the factors determining the composition of 
international capital inflows/outflows during those years. Instead of being 
new commercial bank credit, these flows were propelled forward by the global 
movement toward securitization, which began in the second half of the eighties 
and became more dynamic starting in 1991, immediately after renegotiation 
of the external debt within the framework of the Brady Plan. The article goes 
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on to present the first crisis of securitization in Mexico and some other Latin 
American countries. In Mexico specifically, U.S. investment banks and some 
institutional investors participated in the new surge of international financial 
markets through the net portfolio flows that were placed in private and public 
sector securities. The change in the Fed's monetary policy led to a massive 
shift of capital into other markets, and the most devastating banking and 
economic crisis in Mexico's history.
Keywords: financial crises, institutional investors, monetary policy, securitization
The so-called debt crisis of 1982 broke out in the major economies of the devel-
oping world partly as a result of the policy of raising interest rates launched by 
Paul Volcker’s Fed in 1979. The U.S. federal funds rate averaged 11.2 percent 
in 1979 and reached its highest point of 20 percent in June 1981. Because 
the debt servicing costs were capitalized, the external public debt of some of 
the largest developing economies grew rapidly in the span of a few months, 
finally exploding when banks suspended such capitalization and refinancing 
in 1982. A period of several years of rising payments of accumulated interest 
and principal began, which was accompanied by continual debt restructuring 
and economic and budgetary adjustments, punctuated by deep political and 
institutional transformations.
Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) described the 1980s 
as the lost decade for Latin America, changes in public policy and business 
strategies produced by financial liberalization and military regimes in South 
America initiated the neoliberal transition in the 1970s. By the early 1990s, a 
new round of capital flows poured into Latin America, especially to countries 
that had made reforms to deepen securities markets. These policies included 
opening the bond market to non-residents in public and private debt markets, 
equity flotation of large local private firms (many of which had maintained 
family ownership structures), and the privatization of many public enterprises. 
Thus, public and private companies restructured liabilities and found new 
sources of financing by placing financial instruments in both local and U.S. 
markets. This was all part of the process of change and expansion of U.S. 
investment banking into developing countries that was driven by the IMF and 
World Bank through the restructuring of foreign debt and globally encouraged 
by the stock market crash of 1987. 
The deregulation of U.S. institutional investors in the late 1980s was an-
other important milestone in this process, as investment banks were allowed 
to diversify and expand their portfolios quickly and profitably. These changes, 
mainly in the U.S. financial market, initiated an accelerated flow of financial 
funds from commercial banks, investment banks and, in varying degrees, 
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other types of institutional investors toward Latin American markets. These 
flows occurred in the middle of a rapid process of privatization, mergers, and 
acquisitions (Vidal 2008). Rating agencies went along with this new model 
of financial affairs, finding new areas for expansion in the form of debt secu-
ritization, beyond the ratings of country risk.
However, the new flows were based on securitizing domestic assets in 
international financial markets, which changed the ownership structure of 
large financial and non-financial firms. In Mexico and other countries in 
the region, mutual funds lured by high-yield spreads purchased massive 
quantities of government securities while the stock markets also witnessed 
significant inflows of foreign funds. Thus, when the Fed again initiated a 
policy of monetary restriction by raising interest rates, the expectations of 
returns on financial assets in the region changed and a massive capital outflow 
occurred in 1994–95. 
As managing director of the IMF in 1995, Michel Camdessus described 
the Mexican financial crisis as the first crisis of the twenty-first century. It 
was also the first massive crisis of securitization based on the new financial 
business model that had expanded so quickly since the mid-1980s. In a few 
short years, the financial world had changed significantly. While the Fed's 
doubling of the federal funds rate (which gained around 10 percentage 
points in less than twenty-four months) produced a double-dip recession in 
the United States and a lost decade in Latin America in the 1980s. When the 
Fed doubled the federal funds rate in 1994–95, there was no recession in the 
United States and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries saw a minimal loss of growth (Girón 2002), but there 
was considerable loss of growth in Latin America, especially in Argentina, 
Colombia, Mexico, and to a lesser extent Brazil.
The change in credit flows and the financial business model has been studied 
in the post-Keynesian literature, for example by Guttmann (2008), Minsky 
(1987), and Toporowski (2010), among others. It has also been discussed 
in the orthodox literature, for example, by trying to explain changes in the 
transmission mechanism of the Fed’s monetary policy (McDonough 2002). 
This paper examines the institutional transformations of the Fed's 1993–95 
interest rate policy from the vantage point of its consequences felt in Mexico 
and Latin America. 
Capital Flows and the Emerging Market Boom
In 1992 and 1993, capital markets pumped $51 billion and $113 billion, re-
spectively, into emerging market bonds and equities. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) reached $35 billion and $56 billion in these years. Direct purchases 
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in the domestic money and capital markets and bank loans should also be 
added, bringing total net emerging-market inflows to $260.8 billion and $383.9 
billion, which is an incredible figure when compared with the negative net 
amounts of capital outflows from Latin America between 1983 and 1990. 
The lower profitability of many financial assets in the United States in the 
early 1990s was linked to the U.S. economic contraction and declining interest 
rates, explaining in part the change in direction of capital flows and the growth 
of those directed toward emerging markets, which were also undergoing ac-
celerated processes of financial deregulation. This was followed by a wave of 
large privatizations in the region (especially in telecommunications) and the 
opening of financial markets, processes that were the determining factors for 
the duration and continuity of the reversal of private capital flows. The well-
known debt-for-assets programs of the 1980s lost importance in the 1990s as 
the secondary debt market gradually recovered and assets were no longer so 
heavily discounted. The secondary debt market helped to clean up the balance 
sheets of creditor banks by allowing debt to be purchased at a great discount 
from less solvent banks. The IMF considered that this “rewarded” the “worst 
behavior” of lenders with increased the discounts. 
Between 1992 and 1993 the processes of debt conversion slowed down 
dramatically. According to the creditors themselves, this mechanism had been 
useful to the extent it allowed them to reconfigure portfolios; it also greatly 
aided those interested in acquiring companies in indebted countries, as it low-
ered the cost of investment projects. However, such widespread privatization 
in such a relatively short period created strong demand in secondary markets, 
reducing or eliminating the aforementioned attractive discount. Nonetheless, 
through stock flotation and the sale of derivatives, financial intermediaries 
recovered an important source of profit. Creditor and investment banks chan-
neled the demand for new, highly profitable instruments, securitizing and 
internationalizing not only the assets of privatized companies, but also those 
of private companies that had no presence in these markets. Therefore, the 
conversion program, although attractive at first, showed ever greater limits 
due to the effect of privatizations and mergers and acquisitions. 
Once the creditor banks' balance-sheet problems were solved by securitiza-
tion backed by Brady bonds, investor preference for debt-equity conversions 
lost importance. The flotation of private companies that did not previously 
have shares in the market also expanded the ability of banks to reconfigure 
funds and portfolios, which in turn enabled them to incorporate a much 
wider range of investors from developed markets with diverse interests and 
liquidity requirements. Financial inflows to Latin America in those years 
can be identified using International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Central Banks 
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Statistics about: (a) bond issuances by private and public companies in more 
developed markets; (b) share issuance through American depositary receipts 
(ADRs) and global depositary receipts (GDR) in the United States; (c) direct 
investment in transnational subsidiaries; (d) government bond issuance (such 
as, for example, Certificados de Tesoreria (CETES) and later Tesobonos in 
the case of Mexico) and sale of domestic securities to foreign investors in the 
money and capital markets. 
Bond Issuances by Public and Private Companies 
The bond market was the most dynamic in terms of international capital 
flows toward emerging markets, although the equities and derivatives market, 
which hardly existed before 1990, also produced significant flows to emerg-
ing markets. According to OECD data, in 1994 bonds issued in developing 
countries accounted for almost 9 percent of the world supply of international 
bonds. However, bond issuance in these countries fell to 3.6 percent in the first 
quarter of 1995. The supply of bonds from Latin America was 3.2 percent in 
1993 and fell to 2.4 percent in 1994. In the first quarter of 1995 it was only 
0.3 percent. However, Latin American bond issuance was very important in 
1993, when it came to represent over 40 percent of the developing countries' 
supply of bonds, only to drop again in the first four months of 1995 to 10 
percent (OECD 1995).
In 1993 Latin America’s issuance totaled $23.5 billion and began its fall 
in the first quarter of 1994. According to the IMF, the net total of bonds is-
sued by developing countries reached $117 billion in June of 1994, with 42 
percent corresponding to private sector borrowers. Amounts to be amortized 
from this debt grew quickly due to the relatively narrow profile of maturities. 
For 1994, the IMF estimated credit commitments of around $7 billion (IMF 
1995a: 14).
In 1994, Latin America issued bonds worth about $10 billion, but in the 
first half of 1995 it issued barely $1.2 billion worth. Latin American countries 
issuing bonds included Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, and to a 
lesser extent Barbados, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Trinidad and Tobago. The vast majority of issues were 
in U.S. dollars (between 75 and 80 percent), but also in yen and marks. This 
is explained by the investment banks’ sale of these instruments to U.S. mu-
tual funds, the higher credit rating that issuing countries had achieved, and 
the effect of the Fed's relatively low interest rates. Changes in U.S. market 
regulations also provided a major push to issue and place bonds based on 
Rule 144a, which exempted external private issuance from information and 
solvency requirements that the United States Securities and Exchange Com-
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mission (SEC) demanded foreign issuers to meet and thus enabled qualified 
institutional investors to privately trade security issuances without waiting 
the two years usually stipulated (IMF 1995a: 7).
The factors that market participants take into account when rating bonds 
have invariably been fundamental in determining bond prices. Among the 
elements taken into consideration are: (a) political conditions and govern-
ment's willingness to undergo economic reform and ability to implement 
policies and maintain popular support; (b) macroeconomic conditions, par-
ticularly inflationary expectations, growth, and fiscal policy; (c) progress in 
structural reforms; and (d) the balance of payments and its prospects (IMF 
1995a: 19).
Placement of Equities Through American Depositary Receipts 
and Global Depositary Receipts
Developing countries' placement of equities in international markets grew 
rapidly between 1991 and 1993, but declined in 1994. In 1993, Latin Ameri-
can companies placed equities in the international market in an amount 
estimated at $5.7 billion. This amount fell in the first quarter of 1994 and 
the year closed at $2 billion, with the numbers continuing to fall throughout 
1995 (IMF 1995a: 21).
Latin American equities were issued through ADRs and GDRs, initially 
supported by the privatization process, particularly in the energy and com-
munications sectors. The list of examples is significant: (a) $2.4 billion placed 
in 1993 as a result of the privatization of yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales de 
Argentina; (b) share placements made in 1991 of Telefonos de Mexico, which 
had been privatized shortly before that; (c) placement of shares resulting from 
Brazil's 1997 privatization of companhia Vale do Rio Doce, valued at the time 
at $12 billion; and (d) share issuance resulting from the privatization of the 
Mexican petrochemical industry. The public offerings made in international 
markets  by many of the largest public and private companies should also be 
counted (Alfa, Carso, Cemex, Eletrobras, Telebras, Televisa, Usiminas, and 
Vitro), as well as those by banks in the region (such as Banamex, Banco de 
Bogotá, Banco de Chile, Banco do Brasil, Banco Galicia, Banco Rancher, 
Bancomer, Bradesco, and Itausa,).
In addition to equity placement through both ADRs and GDRs, the direct 
purchase of equities or other instruments in the money market by international 
investors was another important source of capital inflows. However, by their 
very nature these flows were temporary, unstable, and procyclical. An idea 
of their magnitude can be seen in the growth of the portfolios of investment 
funds specializing in emerging market securities, which went from $91 bil-
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lion in 1988 to over $650 billion in 1994 (IMF 1995a: 25). Such rapid growth 
also reflected the increase in stock prices, particularly during 1993, when 
the stock markets of developing countries grew by around 75 percent. For 
Latin America, the funds represented 12 percent of total net assets of funds 
in emerging markets (IMF 1995a: 25). In the case of Mexico, the allocation 
of foreign investments to the money market was further encouraged when in 
1993 the SEC granted “ready market status” to Mexican government debt 
instruments denominated in pesos (Ajustabonos, Bondes, and Cetes,). U.S. 
institutional investors would only incur a 7 percent charge on capital instead 
of the 100 percent required previously. Moreover, in many creditor countries, 
average requirements to cover exposure to developing countries decreased 
gradually (IMF 1995a: 34).
Foreign Direct Investment Through Subsidiaries
The increase in FDI toward some developing countries coincides with the 
period of increasing portfolio investment. This increase is linked to factors 
that have limited influence over a period of time, such as privatizations or the 
relocation of foreign firms’ asset holdings in response to economic reforms. 
However, even the IMF has recognized that it was a mistake to consider FDI 
as a stable source of funding because when difficulties arise in the balance of 
payments, the net effect of the transactions associated with such investment 
on external accounts can exacerbate the imbalance (IMF 1995a: 35).
According to figures from the IMF and the World Bank, FDI in Latin 
America amounted to $14 billion in 1992, $13 billion in 1993, and $38 bil-
lion in 1994. Most of it was directed into Argentina and Mexico, and to a 
lesser extent into Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Notably, over 50 
percent of FDI flows toward developing countries went to Asian economies, 
especially China. In Latin America, the privatization process and the pace of 
economic growth attracted flows, although the subsequent increase in foreign 
investment in emerging markets began to depend on the amount of govern-
ment assets that could be sold, the privatization of public services, and the 
expansion of raw material and energy extraction, among other factors. These 
have also been present in the most recent wave of capital flows into Latin 
America in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Regional economic growth explained the rise in FDI in the second half of 
the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, as it offered significant investment 
opportunities as well as funds for reinvestment. The reinvestment of profits 
has a lower cost for businesses and has been a major part of FDI flows since 
those years. However, this also behaves procyclically, putting further pressure 
on the current account balance.
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Securitization, Tesobonos, and Mexico’s Financial Bankruptcy
The participation of foreign investors in the market for Mexican government 
bonds rose from 3.2 percent at the time of the market’s opening to foreign 
investment in 1990 to 32.8 percent in 1992, and 38.9 percent in 1993. Inciden-
tally, a similar figure was achieved in 2013 just before the privatization of the 
energy sector. The circulation of Tesobonos,1 which were dollar-denominated 
instruments, witnessed an increase of 286 percent in 1993 (Banco de Mexico 
1993). The Fed's rate hikes and the political fragility in Mexico during the 
first half of 1994 forced the government to replace securities denominated in 
pesos (Ajustabonos, Bondes, and Cetes) with Tesobonos, that is, instruments 
having a dollar value that would be sheltered from exchange rate variations.
The demand for Tesobonos allowed the exchange rate some temporary 
stability in the midst of the constant increases in the Fed’s federal funds rate 
and the presidential elections in Mexico, but it did not prevent capital flight.2 
The change in direction of capital flow created a serious deterioration in the 
capital account balance; the Mexican Central Bank reported that Tesobonos 
represented 2.8 percent of outstanding government securities in 1993. A year 
later, this figure had increased to 55.3 percent (Banco de México 1995).
The landscape changed with the December 1994 peso devaluation. In 
1995, the Bank of Mexico had to settle $29 billion worth of Tesobonos (99.1 
percent of the balance that existed in December 1994), about two-thirds of 
which were repaid in dollars. The last round of payouts was made through the 
$50 billion financial package3 that the secretary of Finance and Public Credit 
was able to establish in conjunction with the U.S. government and with the 
support of international financial institutions, the Bank of Canada, and the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The credit guarantee to the U.S. 
government was future revenue from the sale of crude oil.
Since then, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) made ample use of securitization. 
For example, in December 1998 Pemex guaranteed bonds with future crude 
oil sales, issuing $4.1 billion in bonds between December 1998 and July 1999 
through a special purpose vehicle established by Pemex Finance and routed 
through the Cayman Islands. These operations accounted for 24 percent of the 
total issuance backed by future income in emerging markets in the years men-
tioned. In addition, this operation was insured by the Municipal Bond Insurance 
Association (MBIA) and Ambac, lifting the S&P credit rating to AAA. 
The Fed’s Monetary Policy and Its Implications for Mexico 
and Emerging Markets
In February 1994, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee announced 
an increase in the federal funds rate of one quarter point (from 3 to 3.25 per-
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cent). This rate rose six times in 1994 and once more in February 1995. The 
rate was reduced in July of 1995 due to the economic growth of just 1 percent 
in the United States in the second quarter, the lowest since the beginning of 
the recovery. During 1994, the dollar devalued by 10.9 percent against the 
German mark and 10.8 percent against the Japanese yen. In early 1995, the 
U.S. dollar accumulated a loss of 20 percent against the other two currencies. 
The dollar's price against these currencies reflected the effects of the Mexican 
crisis, as well as the uncertainty regarding the financial authorities' abilities to 
curb the risk for various creditors, as the bond market registered heavy losses 
due to the Fed's interest rate hikes. 
Securities from emerging markets were affected and their placement began 
to fall dramatically, even though many thought that these would grow during 
the second half of the year, in a manner similar to the light fall and recovery 
seen in 1992. It was thought that the market would recover not only if the 
number of market participants (the investor base) grew, but also if appropriate 
prices were established, risk management were improved, and continuity in 
public policy maintained. However, the flow of funds from private markets 
fell as a result of rising interest rates. In June 1994 there was a slight recov-
ery, but in the following months it petered out, not because of uncertainty 
regarding interest rates, but rather because of the certainty of future increases. 
Net capital flows to Latin America fell from $63 billion in 1993 to about $43 
billion in 1994 (IMF 1999).
After the market turmoil of early 1994, banks began using credit techniques 
such as creating bonds with built-in exchange rate hedges, like Tesobonos. 
Many of these debt securities entered a repayment stage, as they had been is-
sued at the beginning of the decade. Yet borrowers began to have difficulties in 
paying out maturing debt through the issuance of new debt. The contraction in 
these flows can be observed in U.S. net purchases of foreign securities, which 
fell from $120 to $60.6 billion from 1993 to 1994 (Bach 1994: 6). 
Although Mexico sought to maintain the level of capital flows through 
hedging instruments (Tesobonos), the issuance of Latin American stocks 
began to decline in February 1994. As Tesobonos were short-term instru-
ments, they became one of the elements that created the greatest uncertainty 
for investment funds and banks beginning in January of 1995. Expectations 
of default on these instruments led to the signing of swaps guaranteed by oil 
revenue in February of 1995, allowing important portfolio investors, such as 
Fidelity, Scudder, and Oppenheimer Funds, and investment banks, such as 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers, to hedge their positions 
accordingly (Girón and Correa 1995).
The expansion of capital flows outside the boundaries of important financial 
markets, such as that of the United States, was largely based on the securitiza-
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tion of assets in the early 1990s. According to the OECD, an investor’s decision 
to buy an asset is largely separated from the creditworthiness of the issuing 
institution. The decision depends on the investor’s perception of the ability 
of the underlying asset to generate the cash flows needed to meet contracted 
payments, as well as the degree of protection built into the assets’ structure 
(OECD 1995: 33). The most common underlying assets are mortgages, credit 
cards, and car and consumer loans. 
Incentives for asset securitization, precisely because they are in some way 
disconnected from the solvency of the financial intermediaries, run counter 
to the strength of such institutions. In the beginning, securitization became a 
feature of the U.S. financial system even as it quickly spread across all major 
financial markets. However, it must not be forgotten that portfolio investments 
lack deposit insurance (OECD 1995: 39), or at least they did until the last 
great financial crisis of 2007–8.
In 1995, the Mexican crisis jeopardized segments of the portfolios of (prin-
cipally American) funds and banks. It is therefore important to highlight the 
$3.5 billion private bank funding for the Mexican bailout under the Clinton 
administration's so-called rescue package, which was led by JPMorgan and 
Citibank. A very relevant fact is that the rescue package was amended to allow 
for the participation of such firms in the issuance of new government bonds 
that could be converted into equities in the privatized petrochemical industry 
and the private domestic banking sector. 
Yet the turmoil in the bond market in 1994 particularly affected U.S. in-
vestment banks; even the rating agencies lowered their ratings as their earn-
ings dropped. The ratings of some commercial banks fell even into the third 
quarter of 1995. Competition in the financial sector intensified, as boundaries 
separating investment and commercial banking narrowed. In fact, investment 
banks and commercial banks were increasing their levels of exposure but with 
insufficient capitalization, and they therefore became more vulnerable. Very 
soon, with the Asian and Russian crises of 1997–99, they were involved in 
the most important process of mergers in recent banking history. In 1994, the 
repeal of the McFadden Act also boosted bank mergers and acquisitions. Such 
expansion of bank holding companies and the three large mergers that occurred 
between June and August of 1995 culminated in the merger of Chemical Bank 
and Chase Manhattan. This undoubtedly redesigned the expansion strategy 
of U.S. banks in later months and years (OECD 1995: 143).
The U.S. financial authorities tried to control the effects of successive in-
creases in interest rates on U.S. financial markets in 1994. Banks, meanwhile, 
reconfigured their portfolios within the context of bond market turbulence 
and the systematic elevation of funding costs that could increase balance 
sheet fragility. According to the 1994 report of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
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New York, the successive increases in interest rates caused banks to lose flex-
ibility in managing their reserve positions. At the end of 1994, the potential 
operational difficulties associated with low reserve balances had reappeared 
(McDonough 1994: 15).
As an effect of the rising interest rates, the net performance of many bonds 
held by investment funds was negative that year. This contrasted with 1993, 
when many of these funds had significant profits. Throughout 1994, important 
financial losses were observed in the domestic securities market. In some cases, 
these were associated with exposure to derivatives that magnified the effects 
of changes in returns and the flows of interest payments. Losses on derivatives 
during 1994 were estimated at $6 billion (McDonough 1994: 15).
A soft-landing strategy for the previously high returns in emerging 
economies, especially in Latin America, was also taken into consideration 
by financial markets. However, this strategy reached its limits with the Mexi-
can financial crisis. The benefits of diversifying emerging market securities 
portfolios during moments of expansion may be lost in times of major market 
disturbances. The IMF, therefore, proposed a soft landing by expanding the 
group of investors, diversifying instruments and portfolios, and raising the 
yields and guarantees of money market instruments. In its analysis, the IMF 
noted that the increase in investors could reduce volatility over time, in as 
much as it adds liquidity and further diversifies risk preferences (IMF 1995a: 
29). However, new investors may differ from previous ones in terms of per-
formance expectations, risk preferences, and liquidity needs, and increasing 
the investor base may add volatility and not necessarily decrease it. 
This was demonstrated when the volatility of earnings in many emerging 
markets did not decline over time, but increased. Similarly, it is traditionally 
assumed that individual investors have no ability to influence the price of the 
assets traded in the market (IMF 1995a: 29). But in uncompetitive market 
structures, a small number of large investors do have the ability to influence 
prices. An increase in the number of large investors can therefore actually 
add volatility to markets.
When stock markets in emerging countries were opened to foreign investors, 
the volume and volatility of purchases of U.S. investors increased notably. 
This was particularly evident in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. 
Later, the intensification of pension fund privatizations was conducted in an 
open attempt to stabilize markets (Correa 2010).
The securities industry in the United States was damaged in 1994 by the 
turmoil in the bond market produced by the Fed's monetary policy. This crisis 
and its eventual resolution was an important part of the era's intense financial 
competition, expressed in those years by mounting pressures to remove the 
boundaries between banking and securities trading. Among the participating 
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companies in Latin American share flotation, there were investment banks 
such as Bear Stearns, CS First Boston, Goldman Sachs, and Salomon Brothers, 
and financial conglomerates like Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, 
Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, and Swiss Bank. With its crisis, Mexico took 
another step toward financial deregulation, as well as toward coordinating its 
monetary and credit policies with the Fed and eliminating all protection for 
the Mexican financial sector, including those protections agreed under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Correa 1995).
Trade and financial liberalization in Mexico and Latin America had defla-
tionary effects in the 1990s, repeatedly depressing economic activity in the 
domestic sector: in production, trade, investment, and employment. In the 
countries within the region, successive devaluations pushed down the rela-
tive prices of tradable goods and productive and financial assets, and thereby 
depressed income and investment conditions. Although it was not altogether 
another lost decade for the largest economies, as it had been during the 1980s, 
these were not years of rapid recovery. Rather, the region suffered the rav-
ages of successive banking crises. The reestablishment of the conditions for 
domestic financing in local currencies has since been uncertain and uneven, 
although it is worth mentioning that the countries in which conditions have 
been better are those that have maintained the institutional structures of public 
banks (Correa 2008; Marshall 2011).
The Mexican crisis and the almost simultaneous banking crises in Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Venezuela clearly showed that the path of financial opening 
held a high risk of financial crisis. The participation of U.S. banks in the 
region's portfolio flows and debt placements required the American financial 
authorities to perform the tasks, albeit partially, of lender of last resort. While 
very restrictive credit policies were imposed, the Fed and the U.S. Treasury 
Department nonetheless came up with the funds to rescue U.S. banks caught 
up in the crisis. The close dependence of domestic credit—even in the national 
currency—on international credit was once again demonstrated. The Mexican 
financial crisis of 1994–95, seen as another episode in the transformation 
of the global financial markets, showed that even with national currencies 
intact, the opening of monetary spaces builds a hierarchical credit structure 
that goes hand in hand with the expansion of global financial and nonfinancial 
conglomerates. 
Conclusions
This article argues that the Fed's decisions regarding interest rates and its 
monetary policy have had a decisive influence on the way capital flows to 
Mexico and Latin America. At the beginning of the 1980s, the Fed raised the 
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federal funds rate by almost 10 percentage points, doubling it in less than 
twenty-four months and producing a deep recession in the United States and 
the lost decade in Latin America. However, between 1994 and 1995, the Fed 
once again doubled the federal funds rate, although this time it did not produce 
a recession in the United States. However, it did decrease growth in some of 
the OECD countries, while for countries like Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, 
and to a lesser extent Brazil, it was devastating.
The change in the consequences of the Fed's monetary policy on economic 
activity in the 1990s has been discussed in the orthodox literature, which at-
tempts to frame them as changes in the transmission mechanism of the Fed’s 
monetary policy (McDonough 2002). But credit flows had changed, and the 
expansion of bond markets and credit securitization, especially in the United 
States, changed the conditions of competition between investment banks and 
commercial banks. These manifested themselves in the huge expansion of 
portfolio investment in Latin America's largest economies at the beginning 
of the 1990s, creating a true speculative bubble in securitization that showed 
its first consequences in the form of the Mexican crisis of 1994.
Almost twenty years after the first global securitization crisis, it is im-
portant to reflect on the role played by the Fed in the course of the recurrent 
crises around the world in the run up to the “Great Crisis” that began in 2007. 
As explained in this article, since 1994 the tremendous growth of financial 
markets has created a powerful, hierarchical, global lender of last resort. This 
mechanism is at the same time extremely competitive, segmented and opaque. 
This carefully constructed business model caused its first crisis in Mexico in 
1994, revealing its basic characteristics and showing both its weaknesses and 
its enormous potential to transfer income from almost any economic activ-
ity to financial markets. Almost twenty years later and in light of the 2007 
crisis, it is now possible to revisit the role played by the Fed and other central 
banks in the various international financial crises, their close ties to financial 
conglomerates in global competition, and the role of the great moderation 
that has been imposed on societies around the world. 
Notes
1. Tesobonos were financial instruments of the federal government issued by the 
central bank and indexed to the dollar. Their purpose was to give certainty to for-
eign investors and ensure the presence of foreign investors in the Mexican financial 
market.
2. The results of replacing Ajustabonos, Bondes, and Cetes with Tesobonos was as 
follows: CETES held by foreigners fell by $11.588 million, Ajustabonos fell by $3.894 
million, and Bondes by $799 million. Tesobono holdings grew to $14.338 million.
3. The financial package (Fondo de Estabilidad de la Paridad) grew to more than 
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$50 billion, of which $17.7 billion were committed by the IMF, $20 billion by the 
U.S. government, $1.1 billion by the Bank of Canada, and $2.787 billion by the Bank 
for International Settlements, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB). 
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